The empirical literature has found evidence of locational sorting of workers by wage or skill. We show that such sorting can be driven by asymmetric information in the labor market, speci…cally when …rms do not know if a particular worker is of high or low skill. In a model with two types and two regions, workers of di¤erent skill levels are o¤ered separating contracts in equilibrium. When mobile low skill worker population rises or there is technological change that favors high skilled workers, integration of both types of workers in the same region at equilibrium becomes unstable, whereas sorting of worker types into di¤erent regions in equilibrium remains stable. The instability of integrated equilibria results from …rms, in the region to which workers are perturbed, o¤ering attractive contracts to low skill workers when there is a mixture of workers in the region of origin.
Introduction
What causes agents to sort 1 themselves by skill? For example, Berry and Glaeser (2005) …nd that levels of human capital in cities have been diverging over time.
In other words, more skilled and less skilled workers are separating. Combes et al (2008) …nd strong evidence that wage disparities between French cities are driven by sorting by skill. Mori and Turrini (2005) …nd a similar phenomenon in Japan.
What is the explanation for such sorting? Observations about two other phenomena can help address this question. U.S. Department of Commerce (1975) data show that over the long term, labor has moved out of agriculture and into other industries, thus freeing low skill workers from ties to land and allowing them to become mobile. Second, rising income and wage inequality have been attributed to skill-biased technological change (see for example Acemoglu, 1999; Berman et al, 1994; and Caselli, 1999) . The purpose of our work is to provide a model that is consistent with all of these phenomena. We show that asymmetric information in the labor market drives the sorting of workers by skill. 2 When mobile low skilled worker population rises or there is technological change that favors higher skilled workers, integration of worker types in the same location at equilibrium becomes unstable, while sorting of worker types into di¤erent locations in equilibrium re- 1 We use the term "sort" rather than "segregate" because the latter has the connotation of forced sorting, whereas the former implies self selection. The term "integrated" can also have the connotation of forced integration, but most often it is applied to school integration. That is not an issue here, since schools are not present in our model. 2 For our purposes, skills could be represented by human capital, as is standard in the literature, or by social skills, as in Blum et al (2006) . mains stable. Therefore, our model suggests that increased mobility of low skill labor and skill biased technological change causes the geographic sorting of workers by skill.
What is the informational content of location decisions of workers? Consider a separating equilibrium in adverse selection problems when there is asymmetric information in the market. In a separating equilibrium, agents reveal their types, and di¤erent types are separated by their actions. Can this separation by selection be one of the driving forces of sorting? We present a model that features classical asymmetric information in the labor market resulting in adverse selection. A stable equilibrium in this model has sorting of agents.
We use a competitive contracting framework where there are large numbers of both …rms and workers; each worker can work for only one …rm, and each …rm can employ at most one worker. There are two locations and two types of workers, high ability and low ability. The total populations of the two types of workers are …xed exogenously. The high type dislikes work more than the low type; this conforms to the commonly used single crossing property. Firms have the same technology for production, regardless of location, of a single consumption commodity that depends on the skill level of the worker employed. They know the overall distribution of types, but the type of a particular worker is private information to that worker. The …rms compete with both potential entrants and …rms in the other region. A …rm o¤ers a labor contract that speci…es a lump sum wage based on hours worked; the latter is an indicator of type. We show that no pooling equilibrium, where both types of workers receive the same contract, exists. Location is irrelevant to equilibrium, so any distribution of types across regions is an equilibrium.
Our stability analysis performs a perturbation test on equilibria as follows. A small fraction of workers is pushed from one region to the other. New …rms enter into the region where workers arrive and o¤er new contracts. New …rms in the region of origin enter, not knowing the types of the perturbed workers, and make countero¤ers. The perturbed workers decide whether to accept these new contracts in their new region or return to their region of origin and work under the terms of the new contracts there. To return, there is a small moving cost for high skilled workers, none for low skilled workers. 3 If for all perturbations, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where no workers want to return, then the equilibrium is unstable. Otherwise, it is stable. We assume that …rms in one region cannot observe worker behavior, in particular labor supply or type, in another region. 4 So if a worker is perturbed from a region that has both types of workers in equilibrium, the …rms in the new region cannot infer her type with certainty. Neither can the entering …rms in the region of origin if the workers return. All of these …rms can only use their beliefs, and these beliefs are based on the equilibrium proportions of types in the region of origin. Therefore, at an equilibrium where types are sorted, for example all the low types reside in region 1 whereas all the high types reside in region 2, then the type of a perturbed worker can be inferred by all since the region of origin is known and there is only one type of worker in that region in equilibrium. This is called a sorted equilibrium. This certainty about worker type can be exploited by …rms, and can render such sorted equilibria stable. In contrast, there can also be integrated equilibria where both types cohabit at least one region. Depending on parameters, an integrated equilibrium can either be stable or unstable. Both the total populations of the two regions and the numbers of workers of each type inhabiting the regions will, in general, di¤er in a stable separating equilibrium, sorted or integrated. Stable integrated equilibria exist only when the proportion of mobile low skill workers in total population is small and the technological advantage in productivity of the high skill workers is small. As the exogenous parameter re ‡ecting productivity of the high ability workers increases, perhaps due to skill biased technological progress, or as more low skill workers become mobile, integrated equilibria become unstable and there is a transition to the stable sorted equilibria. 5 The intuition behind the mechanism is that as the 4 Our work is a distant relative of the important paper of Fang (2001) . The major di¤erences include the following. First, our consumer choice, namely equilibrium choice of region, is not costly, whereas Fang's is costly. Second, Fang has a noisy signal, a test value where noise is essential, whereas the second consumer choice in our model, labor supply, is not noisy. (In Fang's model, if there were no noise in the test score, there would be no reason for the culture signal.) Third, Fang uses Bayesian Nash equilibrium, whereas we employ a stability concept natural in the spatial setting. The de…ning notion of region in our model is that worker labor supply is only observable to active …rms in the region where they work in equilibrium. In Fang's model, the analogous notion would be that worker test scores are only observable among the equilibrium group of workers to which they belong (this is not the assumption of that model). Due to these di¤erences, the results from the models are qualitatively di¤erent. 5 This transition is similar to the comparative static transition in the New Economic Ge-productivity of the high skilled rises or as the proportion of low skill rises, it is easier for …rms to o¤er pooling contracts at equilibrium proportions that dominate the equilibrium (…rst best) contracts for the low types (see Figure 4 below). Thus, the low types can use their disguise (as an unknown type) to upset the stability of integrated equilibrium. The sorted equilibria are special, since types are known with certainty, so there can be no disguise. It is our hope that our work prompts further investigation of the importance of information asymmetry in the urban context. 6 Other models induce sorting in di¤erent ways. For instance, Konishi (2008) is a …ne example of sorting driven by local public goods in the Tiebout tradition; he also considers adverse selection in that context. Older contributions include Nechyba (1997) and Peng and Wang (2005) . In this literature, of course, sorting is driven by local public goods, income and taste. Bayer and Timmins (2005) add local externalities. Bénabou (1996a,b) 7 adds dynamics and human capital.
This work all focuses on intra-city sorting as opposed to inter-city sorting. Mori and Turrini (2005) is a …ne example of sorting in the New Economic Geography tradition, where the important comparative static is in transport costs. The driving force for sorting as well as the comparative statics for all of these models are di¤erent from the ones we have advanced. Agent heterogeneity in and of itself is insu¢ cient to drive sorting, since an equilibrium featuring identical population pro…les in each area are possible, as are equilibria where each type has the same share in each region but total populations in regions can di¤er.
ography models due to population growth or a transport cost decrease; see Krugman (1991) . However, unlike the models of the New Economic Geography, our model does not use transport cost or product di¤erentiation. Instead, it features asymmetric information, adverse selection, and a rather standard competitive contracting environment. It is analytically solvable, in contrast with the models of the New Economic Geography (aside from those employing quasi-linear utility). 6 DeCoster and Strange (1993) provide an interesting model featuring asymmetric information and agglomeration. However, the underlying driving force for agglomeration is the presence of exogenous natural advantages of certain locations. 7 Of particular interest is the notion of stability used in Bénabou (1996a) . There is no asymmetric information in that paper, so it involves moving a small measure of a certain type of individual from one location to the other in exchange for the same measure of the other type from the other location. Such distinctions are not possible in de…ning stability in our model, since the types of particular agents are unknown when they are involuntarily moved. Only the equilibrium distribution of types in a location is known.
There is another paper that employs asymmetric information in the economic geography context. Hakenes and Kranich (2010) examine how moral hazard, in contrast with adverse selection, alters some of the basic conclusions of the New Economic Geography literature.
Bencivenga and Smith (1997) examine development traps in a dynamic model of urban-rural migration. Adverse selection is used as a tool to generate unemployment in the urban location. In their model, only the more talented are employed in the urban sector in equilibrium. In contrast, our focus is on information revelation (with no unemployment) and stability.
The various papers on sorting have not only di¤erent comparative static predictions relative to ours, but also di¤erent welfare properties. The equilibrium allocations could be e¢ cient, or second best, or worse. Thus, it is important to know which model is prevalent so that appropriate corrective policy, if needed, can be applied. Thus, the policy implications of the models di¤er.
We proceed to explain the reasons underlying a few of our modeling choices. A natural competitor to our model is a model of perfect competition that has a localization externality between …rms within a region. This externality could, for example, be represented by a Cobb-Douglas …rm production function where output is dependent on private inputs as well as the aggregate quantity of labor of one or both types employed in the region. If each type is complementary to only …rms employing workers of the same type in the same region, then separation of types is a natural feature of equilibrium. We wish to make three points about this alternative. First, in such an alternative model with or without land, the agglomeration of all workers in one location is also a stable equilibrium. Second, in the alternative model with land, the bene…ts from the localization externality are likely to be completely capitalized into land rents and thus passed on to the landowners, provided that land supply is inelastic in each region. This would yield a large set of stable equilibria, with arbitrary population distributions. Third, our model is based on microfoundations, whereas the alternative is not, but the alternative model makes assumptions that in a not very subtle manner yield the outcome.
One alternative to the competitive contracting environment that we have chosen is a purely competitive market framework, assuming that there are many participants on both sides of the labor market. However, asymmetric information in the form of adverse selection causes a breakdown of the competitive market for standard reasons. The low skill workers are the "lemons" in the labor market. Nevertheless, there are many agents on both sides of the labor market, so we use a competitive contracting environment. When we examine stability, there is another reason to consider a contracting model: there are few consumers (an arbitrarily small measure) and many …rms in the labor market.
The opposite of a competitive approach would be to assume that there is only one …rm in each region, and thus there is a monopoly. We expect that our results extend to this framework as well, though the assumption that there is a monopoly in each region does not seem as reasonable empirically as the competitive assumption. If monopolies were observed in regions, one would probably want to employ a large …xed cost rather than a decreasing returns production technology. Another alternative is to use monopolistic competition or oligopoly for the labor market, but these have the same drawbacks as the monopoly assumption and add further complication to the model. After all, we are trying to explain how asymmetric information can cause sorting in the simplest framework possible.
We do not attempt to explain the dynamics of sorting in this paper. Rather, as in the New Economic Geography literature, we perform an extended comparative static exercise to show how critical exogenous parameters a¤ect the characteristics of a stable equilibrium.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model and notation. In section 3, we analyze separating equilibrium, show that there are no pooling equilibria, and examine the stability properties of sorted as well as integrated separating equilibria. A general discussion of the numerical results, with a focus on the comparative statics in productivity of the high ability workers and in the share of the population of high productivity workers in the total population of mobile workers, is found in section 4. Section 5 provides conclusions and directions for future research. Section 6, the appendix, contains all proofs.
2 The model
Notation
There are two regions in this economy indexed by j = 1; 2. There are two types of mobile workers in the economy, indexed by i = H; L. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor. Workers supply labor to …rms and earn a lump-sum wage. Workers are di¤erentiated by their ability (high type and low type). Their populations are denoted by N H ; N L 2 R ++ . A labor contract (w; l) 2 R + [0; 1] between a …rm and a worker speci…es a wage and a quantity of labor. Since workers can only decide whether to take the o¤er or not, but cannot choose a quantity of labor not o¤ered in a contract, there is no loss of generality in using a lump-sum wage.
If a type i worker accepts the o¤er (w; l) from a …rm, her utility is
, where H > L > 0, denote the marginal disutility of labor of the two types. For a given utility level, dw dl
A larger i means a higher disutility from work and that wage or consumption has relatively lower value. This is the single crossing property used in models of asymmetric information, for instance in the vast literatures on optimal income taxation, industrial organization, health insurance, and education economics. As in these literatures, we presume that H > L rather than the opposite for the simple reason that the opportunity cost of time is higher for the high type workers. 8 For example, the high types could be more productive than the low types in home production, and thus the opportunity cost of labor for the high types is higher than for the low types.
For those unfamiliar with the use of single crossing in the aforementioned literatures, we provide some additional background. In the optimal income taxation literature, for example, the single crossing condition we use is actually derived from a natural assumption on primitives. The optimal income taxation literature generally employs indirect mechanisms, namely income taxes or net income func- 8 We do …nd that under the circumstances when worker types are reversed as L > H , a pooling equilibrium may exist. In this case, workers can accept a pooling contract at a corner solution (w; 1): A deviating contract that attracts type H but not type L would be outside the bound of l = 1. Any contract with l < 1 that attracts type H will also attract type L. A deviating contract that attracts type L but not type H can be ruled out under proper parameters where the type L indi¤erence curve passing through (w; 1) does not intersect the type L production function at labor supply less than or equal to 1. If we assume L > H , we again obtain separating equilibria as the outcome; the analogous pictures and algebra yield a contract structure where the low skill type is at a tangency whereas the high skill type might not be at a tangency. A second reason we do not use this version of the model is that it predicts that the high skill wage rate (computed as an average over hours worked) will be lower than the low skill wage rate. tions (gross income earned less tax liability). In that case, the diagrams below are altered to have gross income in place of labor supply on the horizontal axis and net income or consumption on the vertical axis. The basic utility function still has consumption and labor supply as arguments, but for practical use labor supply is taken to be gross income divided by wage (ability or type). All consumers have the same basic utility function, but have di¤erent wages, and these are private information. A simple but important and well-known calculation 9 taking the derivative of the marginal rate of substitution of net income in terms of gross income with respect to wage yields the single crossing condition, provided that consumption is not an inferior good. Due to the Revelation and Taxation Principles, these indirect mechanisms are equivalent to the direct mechanisms we actually employ below, but for simplicity we stick with direct mechanisms.
There are a large number of potential …rms in both regions that will hire these two types of workers. For the convenience of analysis, we assume that …rms are small and one …rm hires at most one worker. 10 Firms have access to two types of decreasing returns to scale technologies. The high type technology requires high type labor while the low type technology requires low type labor. Each of the …rms commit to a production technology upon entering the market. If the …rm faces uncertainty about the type of labor they might hire, the …rm may adopt a mixed technology by choosing a probability mix of the high and low type technologies. That is, the …rm can play a mixed strategy over technologies. The output of a …rm is given by two cases: if a …rm adopts the high type technology and employs l units of type H labor, its production function is
where > 1 and 0 < < 1. If a …rm adopts the low type technology and employs l units of type L labor, the production function is
Parameter represents the technological advantage of the high skill workers over the low skill workers. Type H workers are of higher productivity and are lazier (due to a higher disutility of labor). Take the produced consumption commodity as 9 To the best of our knowledge, this result originates with Seade (1977, footnote 8). 10 It is easy to relax this assumption, but at the cost of more notation.
numéraire. For a …rm that hires with contract (w; l), we discuss its pro…t function in two cases:
(1) When a …rm knows with certainty the types of the workers, its pro…t function takes the form H (w; l) = f H (l) w if it hires a type H worker with contract (w; l), and its pro…t function takes the form
if it hires a type L worker with contract (w; l).
(2) When a …rm does not know the types of the workers, given free mobility of workers, it can infer the probability of hiring a particular type based on the exogenously given proportion of types in the economy. The probability of hiring a type H worker is 11 So …rms can adopt a mixed production function and have expected pro…t function
Firms maximize expected pro…ts over contract o¤ers. Facing potential entrants, …rms will earn zero expected pro…t in equilibrium. If there is a mismatch between the technology selected by a …rm and the type of worker it employs, the output is zero.
To keep things simple, we assume that each …rm o¤ers only one contract. If desired, each …rm could o¤er a menu of contracts instead. There would be no di¤erence in the results.
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, workers choose the most preferred contract terms among all o¤ers. This gives us incentive compatibility conditions. In addition, all accepted contracts must give nonnegative utility to workers. These are voluntary participation conditions. 12 Firms maximize pro…ts, while taking workers'actions into account, 11 Game theorists will quickly realized that we have not discussed updating …rm beliefs, in particular out of equilibrium beliefs. Basically, such a speci…cation would add nothing but notation. It will turn out that pooling contracts will never occur in equilibrium, no matter the speci…cation of beliefs. Beliefs are irrelevant to separating equilibrium. 12 For example, as an outside option they could work in agriculture.
by choosing among contracts that satisfy incentive compatibility and voluntary participation conditions. This is a sequential game where …rms move …rst with contract o¤ers and workers choose the best contracts. The de…nition of equilibrium is formalized in a general way, allowing as many contract terms o¤ered in the market as the number of …rms. The actual number of contracts in the market in any particular equilibrium will be very small as we will see below. Finally, there is free entry in both regions; therefore, equilibrium expected pro…t is zero.
With free mobility of workers and free entry of …rms, location or region is irrelevant to the equilibrium concept. It becomes quite relevant when studying stability, since …rms cannot observe worker behavior, in particular labor supply, in the other region.
Let denote Lebesgue measure on R and let M [0; 1) denote the (Lebesgue measurable) set of …rms that enter the market; note that in equilibrium the measure of M is total worker population. All statements about …rms should be taken as almost sure (in other words, except possibly for a set of agents of measure zero) with respect to Lebesgue measure in …rms or consumers, appropriate to the context. As is standard in measure theory, we denote by "a.s."the term "almost surely." A contract structure is a set of active …rms and a triple of measurable functions, (M;ŵ;l;d), whereŵ :
Here M is the set of active …rms, (ŵ(k);l(k)) is the contract o¤ered by …rm k, andd(k) speci…es the region in which the …rm enters and the type of technology and labor it employs. Speci…cally,d(k) = (1; 0; 0; 0) means that …rm k enters in region 1 and employs the high type technology with the high skill type of labor, d(k) = (0; 1; 0; 0) means that …rm k enters in region 1 and employs the low type technology with the low skill type of labor,d(k) = (0; 0; 1; 0) means that …rm k enters in region 2 and employs the high type technology with the high skill type of labor, whereasd(k) = (0; 0; 0; 1) means that …rm k enters in region 2 and employs the low type technology with the low skill type of labor. Since technology choice is tied with labor types, we do not use extra notation for technology. Let k 2 M , a …rm that has entered the labor market. For ease of notation, we denoteŵ k =ŵ(k) andl k =l(k). Let C be the collection of all contract structures.
Next we de…ne the pro…t of a …rm under a contract structure, and subject to incentive compatibility. Fix a contract structure (M;ŵ;l;d). For expositional purposes, it is best to do this using several cases, with our discussion embedded.
Call the expected pro…t function of …rm k 2 M : k (M;ŵ;l). De…ne the …rms o¤ering contracts that are incentive compatible for the high type as
Analogously, de…ne the …rms o¤ering contracts that are incentive compatible for the low type as
It is possible that either or both of these sets is empty. In equilibrium, they will not be empty. De…ne the set of …rms o¤ering contracts satisfying voluntary participation (VP) conditions as follows:
In contrast with standard mechanism design, here there are competing …rms or principals, so we must specify pro…ts, and thus which workers are attracted to …rms, before de…ning equilibrium. If there were only one …rm, then the distribution of workers could be an equilibrium selection rather than a piece of the de…nition of …rm pro…t.
In essence, the next step before we can de…ne equilibrium is to de…ne the pro…t of a …rm for any pro…le of strategies (contracts o¤ered) by all …rms. This is a rather technical exercise. Then we can de…ne equilibrium using this pro…t function, since we will then know pro…ts of each …rm under unilateral deviations.
Embedded in the exercise of de…ning pro…t for a …rm is a set of beliefs, one for each …rm, about the type of worker they will attract given the pro…le of strategies of all …rms. The appendix contains a complete and formal de…nition of a consistent contract structure, namely that when …rms calculate pro…ts given the contracts o¤ered by other …rms, they account for both the incentive compatibility constraints and the voluntary participation constraints in calculating the type of worker they will attract, and thus the pro…t they expect to generate from production.
Let n 1 H and n 1 L denote the number of type H and type L workers in region 1, and let n 2 H and n 2 L denote the number of the two types of workers in region 2. Notice that we use superscripts to denote regions and subscripts to denote labor types.
An equilibrium subject to incentive compatibility is de…ned as the following.
De…nition. An equilibrium is a consistent contract structure and a population distribution
+ such that: (i) Almost surely for …rms k 2 M , they maximize expected pro…t:
(ii) Firms earn zero expected pro…t due to free entry: 14 almost surely for …rms
Condition (i) simply says that given the contract choices by other …rms, any …rm is choosing a contract that maximizes expected pro…t. 15 Condition (ii) says that due to free entry, in equilibrium any …rm's pro…t must be zero. Condition (iii) features a Lebesgue integral, and says that in equilibrium, in each region and for each type of worker, the number of …rms that are active is equal to the number 14 It would be possible to derive this at equilibrium from the free entry condition. In that case, one would have the …rms as [0; 1), with the inactive …rms using contract (0; 0). Then at equilibrium, if pro…t were positive for any …rm, another would enter and replicate its contract and location, contradicting positive pro…t in equilibrium. 15 Notice that the pro…t function of …rm k, k , is independent of …rm behavior, in particular …rm deviations, on a set of measure zero. Hence, when …rm k deviates from strategy (ŵ(k);l(k)) to strategy (ŵ 0 (k);l 0 (k)), but all other …rms k 0 retain the original contract strategy (ŵ(k 0 );l(k 0 )),
this new contract structure is the same as the old one up to a set of measure zero, measurable, consistent, and yields a mathematically convenient way to represent deviations to check that the strategy pro…le is a Nash equilibrium.
of workers, and that the sum across regions of the number of workers of each type is equal to the exogenously given total populations. Of course, this is only one of many possible notions of equilibrium in the context of asymmetric information; see for example the classic literature of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , Wilson (1977) and Riley (1979) . More recently, Kim (2009) includes unemployment. However, all of these alternative equilibrium concepts, that would also serve as robustness checks for our results, deviate further from perfect competition. Thus, they rely (as we do) on speci…c assumptions about disequilibrium behavior. We have tried to select assumptions appropriate to the spatial context.
There are many possible patterns of equilibria; potentially there can be continua of them. For example, each region may have only one type of worker (sorted) or a mixture of both types of workers (integrated). Firms may o¤er di¤erent contracts to di¤erent types (separation) or they may o¤er the same contract to both types (pooling). We rule out unstable equilibria by a stability notion that operates by perturbing the populations between the two regions. 16 In the following sections, we will examine two patterns of equilibria: the separating equilibrium where there is only one type of worker in each region, called sorted, and equilibria where both types are present in at least one region, called integrated. Of the latter class of equilibria, the pooling equilibria where the same contract is o¤ered to both types is of interest. Various kinds of equilibria will exist for various exogenous parameter values.
Stability analysis
We conduct the following stability analysis on equilibria: 17 1. Disturb the equilibrium by moving an arbitrarily small fraction of workers from a region to the other. We consider a game played from this point on by the perturbed workers and …rms that might enter either region. Its extensive form and justi…cation are as follows. Given that the number of consumers moved is arbitrarily small, and the number of …rms that are potential entrants in the market is assumed to be large, even if there were no information asymmetry, the consumers are at an advantage relative to the …rms. Therefore, facing competition, …rms that enter will earn zero pro…t.
2. Firms do not observe workers' labor supply in the region of origin, but they do know the equilibrium distribution of workers by type. Each entering …rm makes a contract o¤er based on this information:
2.1 If worker types are identi…ed at the region of origin, …rms will o¤er the …rst best contract for that type. In this case, consumers have no informational advantage over …rms, but they do have an advantage in that there are few consumers and many potential …rms. Thus, …rms will choose pro…t maximizing production plans given that they know each worker's type, but will compete until pro…ts are zero. This will turn out to be a special case of (2.2), in the circumstance where …rms know with certainty workers'types.
2.2 If worker types are not identi…ed at the region of origin, meaning that there is a mixture of both types of workers in that region, risk-neutral …rms make contract o¤ers that maximize expected pro…t. In this case, workers have advantages over …rms both in numbers and in information. An entering …rm will make an o¤er before observing labor supply or type, based on population proportions of types in the region of origin at equilibrium.
3. Firms back in the region of origin, from where the perturbed workers have been displaced, can make (zero expected pro…t) countero¤ers to the perturbed workers to return home. Again, they only know the equilibrium distribution of the perturbed worker types. The high type workers face a small moving cost for the return, the low types face no moving cost. 18 (The motivation for this assumption is that high types feature location-speci…c capital that comes into play for perturbations and moves, whereas low types do not. For example, low types might be involved in manufacturing, whereas high types are involved in research that uses teams or labs.) The …rms in the region to which workers have been pushed are aware that the …rms in the region of origin might make countero¤ers.
4. The equilibrium is unstable if for all small perturbations, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where no workers return home. Otherwise the equilibrium is called stable.
5. There is a small continuity issue in the case of sorted equilibria, in that there are only workers of one type in each region, so equilibria with a very small population of the other type in each region could have di¤erent stability properties than the sorted equilibrium. Thus, we examine stability of equilibria with small populations of the other type in the region, if any are close by, and attribute their stability properties to the limiting equilibrium as population becomes completely sorted.
Loosely speaking, the motivation for this notion of stability is that for every objection to the equilibrium, in the form of a perturbation to a new region and corresponding new o¤ers, there is a counterobjection in that some agents will return home. If no agents return home, then there is an objection without counterobjection, so the equilibrium is unstable. In the end, this will reduce to a comparison of the …rst best contract for the low types to a pooling contract, where the equilibrium is stable if the pooling contract is not better for the low types.
Signalling versus Screening
The di¤erence between signalling and screening models is in the order of moves of the game. For example, a worker might signal their ability by choosing a costly signal, education, moving before the …rm that hires them. Screening models have the …rm moving …rst, for example by presenting a menu of contracts for the worker to choose from.
We wish to emphasize that here we employ a variant of a screening model but with many competing …rms. Choice of location by consumers is not a signal, since it has no impact on equilibrium. The aggregate location choices of consumers do have an impact on stability of the equilibrium.
Both signalling and screening models are used in the literature. Screening models have been used in literatures on optimal income taxation, procurement, and insurance. Signalling models are often used in labor economics. However, there is also a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, that employs screening in the labor economics context; see, for example, Landeras and Perez de Villarreal (2005) .
For the purposes of our analysis, and in particular the notion of stability that we employ, there must be some residual uncertainty, conditional on the signal, about a worker's ability. This allows for screening after the signal. There are several reasons this might occur in the real world. The most obvious one is that education, a natural signal, is not a perfect indicator of ability, perhaps because it is noisy. It also might not be a good indicator of social skills, that Blum et al (2006) …nd to be important as a component of unobserved ability. Moreover, education generally is used for human capital accumulation as well as signalling. It would be hard for a worker to choose a scalar, such as education, to optimize both the signal and the quantity of human capital accumulation; likely it optimizes a convex combination of the two. Finally, it is possible that at the equilibrium of the signalling game, the two types end up pooled. In any of these cases, there is residual uncertainty conditional on the signal, and that will lead to wage dispersion in screening equilibrium conditional on the signal.
Characterization of Equilibrium

Existence and Uniqueness of Separating Equilibrium
There are two possible types of equilibria: separating equilibrium, where worker types are revealed by their contract choices, and pooling equilibrium, where both types of workers choose the same contract. We provide in this section a complete characterization of equilibrium contracts. We present a few properties, namely necessary conditions, of the equilibrium contracts …rst. We say that a constraint, such as IC L , IC H , V P L , or V P H binds if and only if it holds with equality for a set of …rms of positive Lebesgue measure. This standard terminology means that the solution to the unconstrained optimization problem of a …rm is not the same as the one with the constraint imposed. Proposition 1. The following hold in equilibrium: (i) V P H and V P L do not bind.
(ii) There is only one contract for each type of worker across locations and …rms.
(
to a type H (respectively type L) indi¤erence curve at the equilibrium contract.
(iv) In a separating equilibrium, IC H does not bind.
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the next proposition, we require a couple of de…nitions to reduce notation. De…ne
so that e l is the best the high type can do with the production function mixed between the high and low types at the economy-wide proportions. Letl be the solution to (
whereas type H workers receive contract ŵ
(iii) Workers reveal their types in equilibrium. In other words, there is no pooling equilibrium.
Please refer to Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the equilibrium contracts with nonbinding IC L , and Figure 2 for the case when IC L binds. In these pictures, the horizontal axis represents labor supply whereas the vertical axis represents wage, output or numéraire. The dashed curves are production functions, the solid lines are indi¤erence curves, and the solid dots are contracts o¤ered to the two types. These diagrams are standard in the aforementioned literatures addressing asymmetric information; see for example Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, Figure 14.C.2) . Therefore, we do not describe their basics in detail. The implication that the voluntary participation constraints do not bind can be seen in the diagrams by noting that the vertical intercept of the indi¤erence curves is above zero. Only the separating equilibrium where …rms can distinguish worker Figure 3 illustrates why a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. De…ne t = N H = (N H + N L ). The dotted curve represents the "mixed" pro…t function and the solid dot the pooling contract. The di¢ culty with a pooling equilibrium lies in the …rms'ability to propose a deviating separating contract that attracts only the more productive (type H) workers. It is always possible to pro…t from deviating to a separating contract with type H workers. Such contracts are represented by the shaded area in Figure 3 .
The reason a separating equilibrium might not exist when the incentive con- Figure 2 : Separating equilibrium, IC L binding straint IC L binds is that a pooling contract can dominate the high type contract for the high type utility when the incentive constraint binds. In Figure 2 , this pooling contract might be in the area between the linear indi¤erence curve for the high type at the separating contract and the high type production function. This pooling contract can, in turn, itself be dominated as in Figure 3 . To this point in the analysis, location is irrelevant. Any distribution of the types between the two regions can be an equilibrium, provided that all contracts are separating.
Worker types are identi…ed by their contract choices in the market. Types will not be pooled together at the same contract. Yet in a spatial setting, there is another kind of integration. Worker types can be integrated in a region or they can be sorted between two regions. In the next subsection we distinguish by their stability properties these two types of separating equilibria.
Stability properties of separating equilibria
Suppose a separating equilibrium has population distribution (n
be the high type share of region j. There are two kinds of separating equilibria: a sorted separating equilibrium has only one type of worker Figure 3 : Nonexistence of pooling equilibrium in each region, i.e., s j 2 f1; 0g , whereas an integrated separating equilibrium has at least one region containing a mixture of the two types, i.e., 0 < s 1 < 1 or 0 < s 2 < 1. We examine their stability as follows. Before stating the precise result, it is useful to present a preliminary argument.
Claim. An integrated separating equilibrium is stable if and only if the pooling contract at equilibrium proportions for each region is not better for the low type than the …rst best contract for the low type.
This means that stability analysis of an integrated separating equilibrium boils down to examining the …rst best contract for the low type and the two pooling contracts at equilibrium proportions, one for each region. That examination is found in the next proposition.
The proof of the claim is rather brief, but informative, so we give it here. Recall …rst from the de…nition of stability that …rms will be indi¤erent among the contracts they o¤er, since such contracts all yield zero expected pro…t. Due to the small moving cost, the …rms in the region of origin know that any o¤er they make to high types will be rejected, since it can be dominated by an o¤er by …rms in the new region, who move …rst. Thus, stability is completely determined by the low types. Suppose …rst that the pooling contract dominates the …rst best contract for the low types. Then if the …rms in the new region o¤er only the pooling contract, and …rms in the region of origin are left with only the …rst best contract for the low types (since the high types will never return), we have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which nobody moves back to the region of origin, so the equilibrium is unstable. If the …rst best contract for the low types is at least as good as the pooling contract, then the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium has the low types always o¤ered the …rst best contract for them, and they move back (assuming that if they are indi¤erent, they move back). Proof. See the Appendix.
The key intuitions and implications of this result are as follows. For the purpose of simulations, we shall focus on the case of a nonbinding IC L . As detailed above, the issue of instability of equilibrium reduces to the question of whether the pooling contract at equilibrium proportions of population for at least one of the two regions is better for the low type than the …rst best contract. An entering …rm makes an o¤er to a perturbed worker before observing labor supply or type, based on population proportions of types in the region of origin at equilibrium. For a pooling contract, risk neutrality on the part of …rms leads to their use of average production functions and average disutility of labor. Thus, an entering …rm can o¤er a pooling contract that maximizes expected pro…t under the average slope of the high and low type production functions and the average disutility of labor , where the average is taken according to the population of types in the region of origin at equilibrium. Furthermore, competition drives …rms' pro…t to zero. Stability analysis employs disequilibrium behavior of …rms and workers, in contrast with the equilibrium contracting behavior studied in section 3.1.
The sorted separating equilibrium is always immune to a perturbation of workers since all agents are fully informed, so contracts are …rst best. Firms will not o¤er a better contract to attract perturbed workers, and the low types will always return to the region of origin. In contrast, when a mixture of workers of di¤erent types is moved to another region, a …rm entering in the destination region will o¤er a contract based on its expectations. This may give the low type a contract better than the equilibrium contract, for the following reason. Consider an integrated separating equilibrium. When the share of the high type in total mobile population is large so that the deviating contract is very close to the high type equilibrium contract, it is not attractive to the low type. This is because the high type equilibrium contract is not attractive to the low type by condition IC L . So an integrated separating equilibrium can be stable. When the share of high type in total population is small enough, an entering …rm will o¤er a more attractive contract (w ; l ) to the low type (see the hollow dot illustrated in Figure 4 ). This renders the integrated separating equilibria unstable. For any given high type productivity , there is a critical regional high type share s( ) such that, for any smaller shares, integration of types is unstable.
Higher creates a larger di¤erence between the productivity of the two types. This allows entering …rms to o¤er a more attractive contract to the low type when integrated with the high type. Thus, when the productivity of the high type is relatively low, integrated separating equilibria can be stable. But when this Figure 4 : Unstable integration of types productivity is relatively high, they will be unstable. For any …xed regional high type share s, there is a critical value of high type productivity, (s), such that a larger means integration of types is unstable. We will illustrate numerically these critical values next in Section 4. 20 
Simulation results
In this section, we illustrate with numerical examples the qualitative e¤ects of two key parameters, the technological advantage of high type workers, , and the share of high type workers in the mobile population, t, on stable equilibria. The equilibrium contract of the low type is …xed by their preferences and production function. The following parameter values are used in the computations: = 0:4, H = 1:2, L = 0:45. 20 In our model (without land), whether or not the fully agglomerated equilibrium with all agents in one region (and thus integrated) is stable or not depends on the parameters.
Equilibrium
As takes a higher value, the high type production function becomes higher and more concave. It pushes both the high type equilibrium wage and labor quantity up. As a result, a high type worker enjoys a higher utility level. Table 1 Table 1 See Figure 5 for a graphical representation. Parameter is graphed on the horizontal axis, whereas the values of the inequality constraints are on the vertical axis (VP: thin, IC: thick, type H: dotted, type L: dashed). Nonnegative values mean that the constraints are satis…ed. When exceeds 1:201, IC L binds, implying that the low skill type will be indi¤erent between the equilibrium contracts for low and high skill types. 
Stability
The share of the high type in total mobile population in a region and the technological advantage of high type workers both a¤ect the stability of integrated separating equilibria. 
is the economy-wide share of the total high type mobile population in the total mobile population. Actually, this share t is the highest value of the minimum high skill share of the two regional shares:
If one region has a high type share higher than t, the other region must have a share lower than t. Thus, the task is reduced to …nding the critical high type share in total population t such that, if t < t, then any integrated separating equilibrium is unstable. In order to discuss comparative statics with respect to t, it is convenient to introduce a large population of immobile workers of the low skill type in the background. These immobile workers can engage in agriculture, tied to land. Their presence allows us to discuss in a simple way how equilibrium changes when more low skill workers become mobile by switching to work in manufacturing, in particular resulting in a decrease in t.
For a …xed t share, there is a critical value such that any integrated equilibrium is unstable for > . Pairs of critical ( ; t) constitute a critical curve that separates the parameter space into two parts. For values above or t values below the critical curve, no equilibrium with integration of types is stable. The bene…t of a deviating pooling contract for the low type (utility from a deviating pooling contract minus utility from the equilibrium or …rst best contract) is presented in Figure 6 (a positive value means integration-of-types is unstable).
A set of critical values ( ; t) is reported in Table 2 . Table 2 With immobile low skill workers in the background (say, working in agriculture), as more are released to become mobile, t shrinks and eventually only sorted separating equilibria are stable. When the technological advantage of the high type increases, the integrated separating equilibria eventually become unstable, whereas the sorted separating equilibria remain stable.
Transition of Stable Equilibria
We illustrate the transition of stable equilibria using a concentration index = s
The index represents the degree to which type H workers are concentrated in region 1 relative to region 2. When = 1, all type H workers are in region 2. When = 0, both regions have the same share of type H. When = 1, all type H workers are in region 1. A larger means a higher share of type H workers in region 1 relative to the share in region 2. The variable is endogenous.
We can now evaluate at equilibrium for changing parameters and t.
21
When t is …xed and the technological advantage parameter increases from 1,
H . For a given high type share in total population t, any regional share combinations s 1 ; s 2 can be supported as a separating equilibrium (sorted integration of types is stable for middle ranges of . In Figure 7 , the shaded area represents the values of pairs of the productivity parameter and the concentration index such that the associated integrated separating equilibrium is stable. This range is diminishing as is larger. When passes the critical (t), any Figure 7 : Transition over for …xed t equilibrium with integration of types is unstable. Then only the sorted separating equilibrium is stable. Thus, sorting can be caused by increased productivity of high skill workers. For example, if t = 0:29, the critical = 1:14. When is …xed and the high type share in total population t varies, we represent equilibria in Figure 8 . The shaded area represents pairs of high type share t and concentration index such that the associated integrated separating equilibrium is stable. For a large high type share t, integration of types is stable for intermediate values of . As more low types become mobile, t decreases and for t t ( ), no equilibrium with integration of types is stable. Then only the sorted separating equilibrium is stable, and once again we have sorting caused by mobility of more low skill workers.
or integrated) if the following condition is satis…ed: 
Conclusion
In this article, we examine whether adverse selection in a labor market with asymmetric information can be a factor that generates sorting of agents by type. We …nd that separation of workers by contract type is sustained as the only equilibrium outcome. There are di¤erent contracts for di¤erent types of workers in equilibrium. Workers of di¤erent types can be integrated in their equilibrium locations. When there is a large share of high type mobile workers in the total mobile population, integration of types is stable. An integrated, stable equilibrium features a similar mixture of workers in each region. When more low type workers are released from their immobility, integration of types becomes unstable. Empirically, this represents a shift of low skill workers from agriculture, where they are tied to land, to manufacturing, where they are free to move. Calculations of the authors from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, p. D 11-23) show that the percentage of the total labor force not in agriculture in the U.S. rose from 52% in 1870 to 96% in 1970. Applebaum (1998, p. 179) …nds that the proportion of skilled workers in the labor force in the US varied from 10% in 1900, 14% in 1950, 12% in 1990, to 10% in 1994. 22 With a smaller proportion of high type mobile 22 Naturally, the de…nitions of skilled and unskilled labor are open to question. This is a particular issue for comparisons across studies. The forces behind changes in the share of skilled labor in the total employed include: changes in education, immigration, labor force workers in the total mobile population, integration of types is unstable. Any stable equilibrium has the large population of low type mobile workers in one region and high type mobile workers separated in the other region. Thus, the increase in the percentage of low skill workers can help explain sorting. The technological advantage of high skill workers is also a key factor in the stability of integrated equilibria. If the productivity of the high type increases, integration of types becomes less stable. Given the same share of high type in total mobile workers, a larger technological productivity advantage of high skill workers results in the sorting of workers by type. This skill biased technological change is consistent with evidence of more recent sorting, for example the Berry and Glaeser (2005) work on human capital di¤erences between cities or the Combes et al (2008) work on wage dispersion across cities. It is also consistent with a general increase in average human capital, provided that greater human capital for the high types is causing their productivity to rise. So, given asymmetric information in the labor market, either increased mobility of low skill workers or increased productivity of high skill workers can result in sorting of workers by type. Extensions of the model include the following. First, land markets can be added and the functional form assumptions can be generalized. We expect similar results. In its current form, the transition to sorted equilibrium is abrupt, as in early models of the New Economic Geography. We expect that, analogous to those models, the addition of land or amenities to our sparse model could smooth the transition. Our functional forms were chosen so that the model is easy to solve analytically. The cost of other functional forms would be more complex calculations; the cost of general functional forms could be no method to solve the model analytically.
The model could be extended to include more regions and more types of consumers (in particular, a continuum of types). More generally, heterogeneity of …rms could be added. If …rm types were common knowledge, then the results would likely be straightforward and similar. But if …rm types were private information, that would complicate the model substantially, since there would be two sided uncertainty in the labor market.
Extensions involving multiple periods and dynamic information revelation are possible but are likely di¢ cult. In communities with small populations, our participation, unemployment, and technological change. For our purposes, the reasons behind changes are not important. model might not be relevant because the type of a particular worker could be easily observable.
Further questions to be addressed include welfare properties of equilibrium allocations and testable implications. Evidently, in the case of nonbinding incentive constraints, the equilibrium will be …rst best, but when an incentive constraint binds, the equilibrium will generally be second best. In the latter case, subsidies to low skill workers (say, conditional on acceptance of a low skill contract) have the potential to loosen the incentive constraint, improving welfare (independent of any equity e¤ects). We have presented some comparative statics that might serve as testable implications. In particular, it is evident from our pictures that high skill workers receive a higher average wage than low skill workers, so one can look for increasing wage dispersion for cities in a country over time, or larger wage dispersion for cities in developed countries in contrast with cities in developing countries. 
d(k) = (0; 1; 0; 0) (if the …rm is in region 1) ord(k) = (0; 0; 0; 1) (if the …rm is in region 2). (iii) Consider the case where the contract o¤ered by the …rm optimizes the utility of both types of workers given the contract structure. Then it is possible for a …rm to attract any pro…le of workers, leading to a pro…t correspondence. To avoid unnecessary complications, and as is standard in the literature on mechanism design, we select a pro…le. It is a discontinuous selection, but again we will guess and verify equilibrium, so its continuity properties are not important.
) (if the …rm is in region 2). That is, when the …rms o¤ering contracts that optimize utility for the high and low types are the same, then a …rm in this set can expect the economy-wide distribution of workers. That is, if a …rm o¤ers a contract that optimizes utility for both types of workers, but contracts are o¤ered by other …rms that are as good for the low type but not as good for the high type, then the …rm expects only high types. (iii.c) Finally, if a …rm o¤ers a contract that optimizes utility for both types of workers but other …rms o¤er contracts that are as good for only the low type, whereas yet other …rms o¤er contracts that are as good only for the high type, then the …rm expects to get the economy-wide mixture of work- 
so (w 00 ; l 00 ) satis…es IC L . These arguments apply to type L as well.
(ii) We prove this for the two types separately. First, suppose there are two distinct contracts (w 1 ; l 1 ) and (w 2 ; l 2 ) o¤ered to type H in equilibrium, and u H (w 1 ; l 1 ) = u H (w 2 ; l 2 ). There are three possibilities: both …rms are certain about worker types and use f H , both …rms are uncertain about worker types and use the expected production function 
There is a new contract ((w 1 + w 2 ) =2; (l 1 + l 2 ) =2) that is indi¤erent for type H (implying IC H ) and yields more pro…t. The new contract satis…es IC L since both (w 1 ; l 1 ) and (w 2 ; l 2 ) satisfy IC L . Case 2 can be argued the same way as Case 1. Case 3: One …rm uses f H and the other uses the expected production function.
Using zero pro…t, it must be that f
There is a new contract (w 1 + H "; l 1 + ") for small " > 0 such that it is indi¤erent for type H (implying IC H ), attracts only type H workers, and increases pro…t. It also satis…es IC L . Second, suppose there are two distinct contracts (w 1 ; l 1 ) and (w 2 ; l 2 ) accepted by type L in equilibrium. There are three possibilities: both …rms use f L , both …rms use the expected production function
…rm uses f L and the other uses the expected production function.
Cases 1 and 2 can be argued in the same way as Case 1 for type H. Case 3: Using zero pro…t, it must be that
There is a new contract (iii) ). By the concavity of the production func-
by the zero pro…t condition. (
Proof. (i) and (ii) We construct the unique separating equilibrium contracts by utilizing results in Proposition 1. First, since IC H does not bind, the low type is always o¤ered a contract at a tangency. Suppose a …rm hires a type L worker with contract (w L ; l L ). By zero pro…t, (l L ) w L = 0 and by tangency of the type L production function and the type L indi¤erence curve,
The equilibrium contract iŝ
For part (i), if by concavity whereas IC H is satis…ed due to the slope di¤erence, H > L , of indi¤erence curves.
To this point of the proof, we have used necessary conditions for equilibrium contracts to solve for them. To prove formally that these are equilibrium contracts, we must show that there are no independent, pro…table …rm deviations. For part (i), this can easily be seen, for example, using Figure 1 . These are …rst best contracts. Any alternative contract o¤ered by a …rm will yield negative pro…t, or will violate a production constraint. For part (ii), we must ensure that there is no pooling contract that will give higher utility to the high type than the proposed separating contract. Calculations yield the weak inequality given in part (ii).
(iii) Suppose there is a nontrivial pooling contract (w; l) 6 = (0; 0) in the market that both types of workers accept with a high type share
. If a …rm can o¤er a di¤erent contract arbitrarily close to (w; l) that attracts type H workers but not type L workers, it can use production function f H instead of the average of two production functions. This brings more pro…t since the increase in production is a discontinuous jump. A contract (w L "; l ") for small " > 0 is that kind of deviating contract. A type H worker is indi¤erent between the deviating contract and (w; l), while a type L worker prefers (w; l), since u L (w H "; l ") = w L l + ( L H ) " < u L (w; l).
Proposition 3.
(i) A sorted separating equilibrium with nonbinding IC L is always stable.
(ii) A sorted separating equilibrium with binding IC L is always stable.
(iii) An integrated separating equilibrium with either a binding or a nonbinding IC L is stable if and only if Proof.
(i) Sorted separating equilibrium with nonbinding IC L : When the two types of workers are sorted by location in a separating equilibrium, …rms know for sure the type of a worker coming from a particular region. All agents are fully informed. Thus, when a worker moves to another region, an entering …rm o¤ers a …rst best contract that yields zero pro…t. This contract turns out to be that same …rst best contract that the worker receives in equilibrium. This is where part 5 of the stability notion comes into play. Although the high types will not move back to their region of origin due to the moving cost, any low types will (assuming that if they are indi¤erent, they move back). This yields a stable equilibrium, as the limit of stable integrated equilibria that tend to the sorted equilibrium.
(ii) Sorted separating equilibrium with binding IC L :
In equilibrium, the contract for the high type is second best. When a high type worker is perturbed, an entering …rm o¤ers the …rst best contract, and the worker stays in the new region. However, the same argument as in (i) applies for low skill workers and equilibria that are integrated but close to sorted. See condition 5 of section 2.3.
(iii) Integrated separating equilibrium with a nonbinding IC L : Using the claim, we must simply compare, for the low types, the pooling contract to the …rst best contract.
The stability of an integrated separating equilibrium depends on the composition of its worker populations, since the composition determines the pooling contracts (one each for workers perturbed from the two regions). When a small measure of workers is moved from region j to the other region, the …rms hiring the perturbed workers have expected output
Since the workers cannot be distinguished, …rms will pay a uniform wage rate to all workers that equals the expected disutility of labor
Pro…t maximization determines the quantity of labor hired l :
This means l = (s j + (1 s j )) 1 1
:
By competition, the …rm will o¤er a total wage w at zero pro…t.
Type L workers will prefer it over the …rst best contract if w L l >ŵ L LlL ; or
Integrated separating equilibrium with a binding IC L : Exactly the same calculations work when IC L binds, since the behavior of the high type is irrelevant. Hence, the equilibrium is unstable if and only if the low type workers want to stay in their new region, thus rendering the behavior of high types irrelevant, and reducing the problem to the same one as with a nonbinding IC L .
(iv) Let 
We have
This means
Therefore, ( ; s) > ( ; 0) for all s close enough to 0. is increasing in , and thus is bounded away from zero. Notice, however, that @ ( ; s) @ j s=0 = 0
We conclude that ( ; s) > ( ; 0) if and only if is large enough.
